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Dehumanizing the Victim
Yeong O. Park and Sang H. Park*
Department of Psychology, Chungbuk National University, Cheongju, South Korea
We hypothesized that observing social exclusion would influence observers’ judgments
of the humanness of its victims and perpetrators. Specifically, we speculated that
people would attribute victims and perpetrators to lower and higher mental capacities,
respectively. Participants observed a simulated computer-based ball tossing game in
which one of the players was either ostracized or not. They then rated the game players
on traits associated with two dimensions of humanness, namely Human Nature (HN) and
Human Uniqueness (HU). Overall, participants who witnessed an exclusion game judged
the victim as less human on both domains compared to one of the perpetrators as well
as to a player in the control condition. The perpetrator was attributed higher HN, but not
significantly higher HU, compared to the control player. In addition, the less HN attributes
a target was assigned, the more she was expected to be vulnerable to exploitation. On
most of the other measures of target impression, however, the victim was rated more
favorably than the perpetrator. The findings imply that social exclusion victims are often
subtly derogated compared to the perpetrators, even while they are also more positively
evaluated otherwise.
Keywords: ostracism, exclusion, dehumanization, mind perception, social perception
INTRODUCTION
Ostracism is a social phenomenon in which a person is being excluded and ignored by others
(Williams, 2007). It has detrimental effects on the victims (Olweus, 1993;Williams, 2001; Baumeister
et al., 2007), sometimes resulting in extreme and tragic consequences such as school shootings or
suicides. In social contexts where ostracism occurs, third party observers often play the role of
passive bystanders (Howard et al., 2014). Such non-intervention by observers may be interpreted
by the perpetrators as implicit condoning of their malicious actions and thus can effectively lead
to further reinforcement of those actions (Nishina and Juvonen, 2005). Therefore, understanding
the psychological factors that keep observers from intervening in ostracism may offer hints about
how to better regulate ostracism. In the current research, we focused on observers’ perception of
victims and perpetrators of social exclusion. Specifically, we examined the extent to which observers
perceivemental qualities that distinguish human beings from other animals or objects (Haslam et al.,
2005) in the ostracized and the ostracizing. By demonstrating that observers are less likely to ascribe
human qualities to victims of social exclusion and thereby subtly derogate them, we aim to offer one
explanation of why observers often neglect to intervene in and even justify social exclusion.
Ostracism and its Observers
Ostracism often occurs when there are others around, and these other people can play distinct and
significant roles in ostracism. Somemay actively assist the perpetrator, othersmay defend the victim,
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and still othersmay just keep acting as passive bystanders (Olweus,
1993; Salmivalli, 2010). Studies have shown that observers’
appropriate reactions to ostracism can be effective in reducing
its negative impacts on the victim (Salmivalli et al., 2011).
For example, observers’ active intervention can give victims
psychological benefits such as decrease in negative emotions
and boost in self-esteem (Sainio et al., 2011), while passively
witnessing the victim’s adversity does not provide such help
(Nishina and Juvonen, 2005). However, observers only rarely
actively help the victim (Salmivalli and Voeten, 2004). There are
several reasons for this: For one thing, people are influenced
by others around them (Bandura, 1977), so if there is no one
intervening, observers may not take the situation as serious
enough for attention (Chekroun and Brauer, 2002; Teräsahjo and
Salmivalli, 2003).Or observersmaynot feel personally responsible
for defending the victims (Latané and Darley, 1968) and instead
expect others to take actions. They may also decide to stay silent
for fear of retaliation from the perpetrator (Thornberg, 2007) or
because of low expected self-efficacy of their intervention (Hazler,
1996; Lodge and Frydenberg, 2005).
Even at the same time as observers generally report sympathy
toward ostracism victims, they often exhibit negative feelings at
the victims. Rigby (1996) noted that although many bystanders
reported anti-bullying attitudes, nearly half of the sample
indicated negative attitudes not toward the perpetrators, but
toward the victims. According to more recent research, observers
with biased perceptions of the victim direct the blame and
responsibility for the situation at the victim (Schuster, 2001;
Teräsahjo and Salmivalli, 2003): When people become aware of
the victim’s previous history of victimization, they are more likely
to put the blame or responsibility for the ostracism situation
on the victim (Schuster, 2001). Accordingly, once someone is
perceived as a victim, peoplewould think that the victim somehow
deserves their plight and be indifferent to the victim’s suffering,
whichmay contribute to even further exclusion. Given the reasons
for observers’ passivity after witnessing an exclusion incident,
it is probable that they would form impressions of the victim’s
characteristics that can offer explanations about why the exclusion
is taking place, and such impressions can be unfavorable toward
the victims.
Ostracism and Denial of Human Values
One possibility that observers of ostracism would treat the
victim is to neglect to perceive the target’s aspects as a human
being. Kelman (1976) defined dehumanization as “denying a
person’s characteristics as an individual, independent human and
his interconnectedness as part of a social network.” As such,
dehumanizing entails deprivation of the rights to be treated
inside the moral circle (Bandura, 1999). Although extreme
dehumanization—whereby a human being is not perceived
as one—would be limited to extreme cases, researchers have
demonstrated how more subtle forms of dehumanization can
emerge in various situations. Recent years have witnessed several
different dimensions of human qualities put forth; a dearth of any
of these would imply that the target being perceived is not entirely
worthy of being treated as a human being. These dimensions
include agency and experience (Gray et al., 2007), competence,
warmth, and morality (Fiske et al., 2002; Leach et al., 2007), and
secondary emotions (Leyens et al., 2000).
In the current research, we employ the model by Haslam
et al. (2005). Haslam et al. (2005) argued that to be treated
as a human being, assumption of mental capacities that are
largely distinct from one another is required. Specifically,
building on previous conceptualizations of dehumanization,
they suggested two dimensions of human characteristics that
differentiate human beings from machines (Human Nature;
HN) and from animals (Human Uniqueness; HU), respectively.
HN traits are deeply rooted, unchanging, and inherent human
characteristics, associated with social warmth, emotionality, and
cognitive openness. HU traits, on the other hand, are mental
dimensions traits that represent cognitive capability, civility and
moral sensibility, acquired through cognitive maturation (Haslam
et al., 2005; Haslam, 2006). Using this framework, Haslam and
their colleagues have shown that people are less likely to attribute
human qualities to others versus the self (Haslam et al., 2005) and
to outgroups versus the ingroup (Bain et al., 2009). More recently,
Yang et al. (2015) demonstrated that dehumanization on these two
dimensions can happen even to the self, when the self is thought
to be lacking in power.
Ostracism ruins people’s connection to their social community.
It leads to perceived loss of what they had essentially in common
with others, namely the human value. Bastian and Haslam (2010)
demonstrated that those involved in ostracism (as the victim or
as the perpetrator) perceive themselves and the other person
differently on these dimensions. In their research, victims of social
exclusion perceived themselves as lower on humanness (Haslam
et al., 2005) compared to those uninvolved in ostracism. They
not only attributed traits that define humanness to themselves
less than controls did of themselves, but also expected that they
would be seen as having less human traits by a third party (Bastian
and Haslam, 2010). Perpetrators also perceived the victims (in
addition to themselves) as less human (Bastian et al., 2013). These
findings demonstrated how social disconnection is related to
perception of human values.
We suspected that by dehumanizing ostracism victims,
observers cannot only explain why the victims were excluded, but
also justify their indifference and inaction toward them. Research
that examined causes of observers’ inaction in ostracism focused
mostly on bystander effect (Latané and Darley, 1970; Hazler,
1996; Teräsahjo and Salmivalli, 2003; Lodge and Frydenberg,
2005; Pozzoli and Gini, 2010), and it has been rarely investigated
whether and how observers’ judgment of the victim’s (and the
perpetrator’s) human qualities can be affected by exclusion status.
Hypothesis and Study Overview
Although observers of social exclusion in general report pro-
victim attitudes (Salmivalli and Voeten, 2004), they often harbor
negative beliefs toward the victims at the same time, that
the victim is deviant from non-victims and/or deserves the
adversity (Schuster, 2001). In the current study, we investigated
how witnesses of ostracism perceive the victim as well as the
perpetrators of ostracism in terms of human qualities. We
hypothesized that observers would depreciate the victim’s human
qualities (i.e., human nature and human uniqueness) in subtle
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ways. Such victim derogation can serve at least two functions: to
explain why ostracism happened (so that they can make sense of
the associated injustice) as well as to justify their own inaction
(so that they would feel less discomfort). To demonstrate this, we
examined how observers would evaluate the victim on Haslam
et al. (2005) HN and HU traits. Additionally, we examined
how dehumanization of exclusion victim, if it occurs, could
account for observers’ expectations about the victim’s lower social
functioning; to be more specific, of being exploited by others.
We expected that to the extent that the victim was perceived as
lacking in human qualities, they would be more likely to be seen
as vulnerable to being taken advantage of by others.
What about the perpetrators—would they be assigned relatively
higher human qualities than the victims? Past research has
demonstrated that ostracism perpetrators are dehumanized by
both the victims and the perpetrators themselves (Bastian et al.,
2013) but it was open to question how observers would see
them compared to both the victims and to those uninvolved in
ostracism.
Lastly, for exploratory purposes, we also measured and
compared several other constructs studied in themind perception
and the dehumanization literature (Agency and Experience: Gray
et al., 2007; Competence, Warmth, and Morality: Fiske et al.,
2007; Leach et al., 2007) as well as Big 5 personality trait
dimensions (John and Srivastava, 1999), to see whether we would
observe patterns of dehumanization or victim derogation on these
aspects in a similar fashion as on HN and HU. Specifically,
we examined whether our hypothesized dehumanization of the
exclusion victim would generalize to these other measurements
of mind perception. Because it was for mainly exploratory reasons
that we included these measures, we left as an open question how
social exclusionwould affect participants’ perception of the victim
(and the perpetrator) on these dimensions.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
Two hundred and eighteen undergraduate students taking
psychology courses in a large South Korean public university (99
women, age M = 21.5, SD = 2.1) took part in the study for
partial course credit. This study was reviewed and approved by
the departmental Institutional Review Board (which operated in
lieu of the not-yet-established university-level IRB). The studywas
conducted in compliance with the ethical standards of APA in the
treatment of the human subject sample.
Procedure
Participants were seated in cubicles individually. After they
signed the written consent form, participants were told that the
purpose of this study was to investigate if people can guess
others’ psychological characteristics solely by observing their
online activities. And then they watched an alleged “recorded
session” of an online ball-tossing game. The clip was actually a
simulated session of Cyberball, a game paradigm used in studies
on psychological effects of ostracism (Williams et al., 2000).
In the original Cyberball procedure, participants play the game
with two or three other “players” (who actually are computer-
controlled) and are made to experience being excluded or not,
through manipulation of the number of ball tosses. In this study,
we modified the Cyberball paradigm so that all three players
were controlled by computer program and participants simply
watched the game as an observer. Also unlike in the original
three-player Cyberball (in which the three players were positioned
in an upside-down triangular formation), the middle player was
placed at the top of the triangle to prevent participants from
spontaneously identifying with that person (Libby et al., 2009).
Participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions
(Control or Exclusion) and watched the assigned game. In the
Control game, each player received the ball one third of the
time from other players, while in the Exclusion game one of the
three players (randomly chosen to be either the left or the right
player) was tossed the ball only twice and was ignored by the
other players for the rest of the game. The total throws in each
game were 30. Throughout the session, faces described as the
players’ (all female) were displayed next to the corresponding
virtual ball-tossers. Participants then rated their impressions of
the two players at the bottom (i.e., the victim and one of the
perpetrators in the Exclusion condition, and their counterparts in
the Control condition) in terms of characteristics detailed below;
the order of evaluations (victim first or perpetrator first) was
counterbalanced. After completing a demographics questionnaire
and an open-ended question about their guesses of the study’s real
purpose, participants were thanked and fully debriefed.
Measures
All questionswere presented accompanied by 7-point Likert scales
(e.g., 1 = “Not at all”; 7 = “Very much”).
Dehumanization
Participants rated the two players on a list of 20 traits of HN and
HU (translated fromBastian andHaslam, 2010 into Korean by the
authors) with 5 positive and 5 negative traits on each dimension.
Participants were asked to “evaluate (the name of each player)
on the characteristics she is expected to have, based on the game
you just observed,” and then to “rate on the given scale how
much (each trait word) describes (the name of each player).” Traits
included “active,” “curious,” “friendly,” “helpful,” “fun-loving,”
“impatient,” “impulsive,” “jealous,” “nervous,” and “shy” for HN,
and “broadminded,” “conscientious,” “humble,” “polite,” and
“thorough,” “disorganized,” “hard-hearted,” “ignorant,” “rude,”
and “stingy” forHU (5 each for positive and negative dimensions).
The traits were presented in a random order. Two positive
(“friendly” and “helpful”) and two negative (“nervous” and “shy”)
HN traits did not correlate well with other items in each scale,
and were accordingly excluded from average scores (excluding
them did not significantly change the results). Cronbach’s as
for the victim were 0.83 (positive) and 0.70 (negative) for HN
traits, and 0.78 (positive) and 0.73 (negative) for HU traits. For
the perpetrator, Cronbach’s a = 0.77 and 0.62 each for positive
and negative HN traits, and 0.81 and 0.73 each for positive
and negative HU traits. Initial examination of the relationships
betweenHN andHU scores revealed different patterns depending
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on the valence: Positive HN and HU scores were either weakly
correlated (for the victim, r = 0.21, p = 0.002) or uncorrelated
(for the perpetrator, r =  0.05, ns), but the negative scores were
strongly positively correlated (r = 0.63, p < 0.001 for the victim
and r = 0.69, p < 0.001 for the perpetrator). That the negative
HN andHU scores were strongly correlated with each other poses
concerns over how to interpret results involving them; this issue is
further examined in Discussion.
Vulnerability to Exploitation
To measure the proneness to be exploited by other people, we
asked participants the question “How easily would the target
person be taken advantage of, compared to other people?” The
scores were recoded so that a higher score mean being more
vulnerable to exploitation.
Agency and Experience
According to Gray et al. (2007), minds have two qualities, each
of which varies on a continuum: Agency (the capacity to think
and determine) and Experience (the capacity to feel emotions
and senses). Targets who are perceived to be higher on Agency
are more likely to be expected as agents of actions, while those
viewed as higher on Experience are more likely to be seen as
recipients (i.e., “patients; Gray andWegner, 2009) of actions. Items
measuring Agency and Experience (3 each) were adopted from
Gray et al. (2007). Three items each that had the highest loadings
on each factor in Gray et al.’s data were selected and used. Agency
items (Cronbach’s as = 0.85 and 0.83, respectively, for the victim
and for the perpetrator) tapped mental capacities of self-control,
morality, and memory (e.g., “How much is the target person
capable of self-control, compared to other people?”). Experience
items (Cronbach’s as = 0.65 and 0.72, respectively, for the victim
and for the perpetrator) evaluated the person’s susceptibility to
feel pain, fear, and hunger (e.g., “How much is the target person
likely to feel pain, compared to other people?”).
Intention/Responsibility
To see whether the victim and the perpetrator statuses would
influence observers’ attribution of intention and responsibility
for an action, we used 2 questions from Gray and Wegner
(2009) that measure perceived intention and responsibility for
a hypothetical, ambiguously harmful behavior. For each of the
two targets, participants were asked to answer the questions
“If X (the person’s name) bumped into someone who walked
toward her from the opposite side, how intentional/responsible
was the target’s behavior?” Because ratings for the two items were
significantly correlated with each other (rs > 0.40, ps < 0.001),
their mean scores were used for analysis.
Competence, Warmth, and Morality
In Fiske et al. (2007) Stereotype Content Model (SCM),
Competence andWarmth are the two basic dimensions of human
characteristics, which are ascribed to different extents tomembers
of different social groups (Fiske et al., 2002). Those who are
evaluated as low on these dimensions—especially those who are
rated low on both—are perceived as less human. Leach et al.
(2007) later argued for a tripartite model of social perception,
adding Morality as a third, independent dimension. Items for
these scales (3 traits each) were translated from those used in
Leach et al. (2007): Competence (“intelligent”, “competent”, and
“skilled”; Cronbach’s a= 0.78 and 0.75 respectively, for the victim
and the perpetrator), Warmth (“likeable”, “warm”, and “friendly”;
Cronbach’s as = 0.86 and 0.84), and Morality (“honest”, “sincere”,
and “trustworthy”; Cronbach’s as= 0.82 and 0.77).
Personality Traits
Participants completed a shortened 15-item Korean version of
big five inventory (BFI; John and Srivastava, 1999) translated and
validated by Kim et al. (2011). Participants rated the two targets
on Extraversion, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, Neuroticism,
and Openness to Experience, with 3 items each (e.g., “is talkative”
for Extraversion; “has a vivid imagination” for Openness). All five
factors showed high internal consistencies (all Cronbach’s as at
least 0.78).
RESULTS
Humanness
For the sake of brevity, we will refer to the two targets in the
Control condition as the victim and the perpetrator, based on
their correspondence (i.e., same face image used) with those in
the Exclusion condition. When corresponding targets in the two
conditions are compared to each other, we will refer to those in
the Control condition as controls.
Mean ratings of HN and HU were analyzed using three-way
mixed ANOVAs with Player (Victim or Perpetrator) and Valence
(Positive or Negative) as within-subject factors, and Condition
(Exclusion or Control) as the between-subject factor. Table 1
lists the descriptive statistics of these measures (as well as all the
other target perception measures) in different conditions, and
Figures 1A,B depicts HN and HU scores broken down by the
factors.
Human Nature
For HN traits, there was a significant main effects of Player, F(1,
216) = 85.14, p < 0.001, !2 = 0.28, as well as a marginally
significant main effect of Condition, F(1, 216) = 2.79, p = 0.10,
!2 = 0.01. There were tendencies of the victim being perceived
as less human, as well as of players in the Exclusion condition
beingmore dehumanized. Valencemain effect was not significant.
All two-way interactions were significant: Player  Valence, F(1,
216) = 40.89, p < 0.001, !2 = 0.16; Valence  Condition, F(1,
216) = 14.60, p < 0.001, !2 = 0.06; and more importantly,
the expected Player  Condition interaction, F(1, 216) = 50.51,
p < 0.001, !2 = 0.19. A closer examination of the last interaction
revealed that the victimwas rated as having lessHNcharacteristics
than her counterpart in the Control condition, F(1, 216)= 50.86,
p < 0.001, !2 = 0.19, while the perpetrator was viewed as having
more HN traits than the control, F(1, 216) = 14.57, p < 0.001,
!2 = 0.06. The results support our hypothesis that the exclusion
victim would be perceived as less human by observers, while
also showing that the perpetrator of exclusion is seen to be more
human than even someone uninvolved in exclusion. Lastly, these
two-way interactions were qualified by a significant three-way
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TABLE 1 | Means (standard deviations) of target perception measures.
Victim Perpetrator
Exclusion Inclusion Exclusion Inclusion
Human Nature
Positive 3.22 (1.27) 3.93 (1.16) 3.98 (1.44) 4.01 (1.23)
Negative 2.65 (1.01) 3.62 (1.06) 5.07 (1.19) 3.95 (1.13)
Human uniqueness
Positive 4.24 (1.04) 4.04 (0.94) 2.48 (0.80) 3.63 (0.96)
Negative 2.60 (0.85) 3.10 (0.93) 4.54 (1.02) 3.33 (0.96)
Vulnerability to Exploitation 4.66 (1.43) 4.23 (1.36) 4.00 (1.80) 4.20 (1.50)
Agency 4.51 (0.79) 4.27 (0.95) 3.15 (0.92) 3.97 (1.07)
Experience 4.02 (0.94) 4.03 (0.80) 4.49 (1.23) 4.25 (0.85)
Intention/Responsibility 2.74 (1.07) 3.28 (1.11) 4.31 (1.08) 3.53 (1.21)
Competence 3.70 (1.04) 3.78 (0.97) 2.91 (1.04) 3.72 (0.92)
Warmth 4.03 (1.33) 3.81 (1.22) 2.32 (1.00) 3.54 (1.10)
Morality 4.05 (1.13) 4.08 (1.00) 3.19 (1.17) 3.88 (0.98)
Extraversion 3.01 (1.30) 3.81 (1.33) 4.17 (1.60) 3.98 (1.32)
Agreeableness 4.82 (1.11) 4.21 (1.31) 2.50 (1.07) 3.82 (1.16)
Conscientiousness 4.15 (1.15) 4.22 (0.99) 3.14 (1.11) 3.94 (1.09)
Neuroticism 3.88 (1.31) 3.61 (1.14) 3.41 (1.42) 3.50 (1.21)
Openness to experience 3.32 (1.15) 3.59 (1.11) 3.10 (1.33) 3.65 (1.13)
FIGURE 1 | Human Nature and Human Uniqueness scores. The left side (A) and the right side (B) depict the Inclusion and Exclusion conditions, respectively.
interaction of Player  Valence  Condition, F(1, 216) = 22.68,
p < 0.001, !2 = 0.10. Simple effects analyses demonstrated that
the victim was attributed less HN characteristics on both positive
and negative traits than the control; positive: F(1, 216) = 18.68,
p < 0.001, !2 = 0.08, negative: F(1, 216) = 47.92, p < 0.001,
!2 = 0.18. In other words, observers devalued the victim on
both positive and negative aspects of HN. On the other hand, the
perpetrator was attributed similar degrees of positive HN traits
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compared to the control but more negative HN traits; positive:
F(1, 216) = 0.03, ns, negative: F(1, 216) = 50.85, p < 0.001,
!2 = 0.19.
Human Uniqueness
For the HU dimension, the main effect of Valence was significant,
F(1, 216) = 10.45, p = 0.001, !2 = 0.05 so that the targets were
rated higher on positive than negative HU traits. Neither Player
nor Condition main effects were significant, both Fs < 1.01,
ns. The expected Player  Condition interaction was significant,
F(1, 216) = 3.91, p = 0.049, !2 = 0.02: Consistent with HN
results, the victim was attributed marginally less HU traits than
the control, F(1, 216) = 3.65, p = 0.06, !2 = 0.02. In contrast,
no significant difference was found between the perpetrator and
the control, F(1, 216) = 0.13, ns. Significant interactions of
PlayerValence, F(1, 216)= 187.62, p< 0.001, !2 = 0.47, and of
Valence  Condition, F(1, 216) = 42.56, p < 0.001, !2 = 0.17,
were also observed. Again, these 2-way effects were qualified
by a significant Player  Valence  Condition interaction, F(1,
216)= 93.50, p< 0.001,!2= 0.30. Simple effects analyses revealed
that the victim was comparable to the control in how much
positive HU traits they were perceived to have, F(1, 216) = 2.13,
ns, but was perceived to possess less negative HU traits compared
to the control, F(1, 216)= 17.10, p< 0.001, !2 = 0.07.Meanwhile,
the perpetrator was attributed less HU positive and more HU
negative traits than the control; positive: F(1, 216) = 93.18,
p < 0.001, !2 = 0.30, negative: F(1, 216) = 81.51, p < 0.001,
!2 = 0.27.
Results of humanness ratings revealed that, first, the victim
was perceived as having less HN traits and marginally less
HU traits compared to the control. The difference in HN
traits were driven both by exclusion effects on both positive
and negative traits, while the difference in HU traits were
driven mostly by exclusion effect on negative traits. In other
words, the exclusion victim was dehumanized in terms of
HN characteristics largely across the board, while HU-related
dehumanization happened mainly with negative characteristics.
These results—especially that regarding HN dimension—support
our hypothesis that when people get excluded, they are perceived
at a lower degree of humanness. The data also revealed that
this dehumanizing effect was more prominent in the domain
of HN than HU: When only the victim data was examined,
the Condition  Humanness Dimensions (HN vs. HU) 2-way
interaction effect was significant, F(1, 216) = 34.26, p < 0.001,
!2 = 0.14, as was the Valence  Condition  Humanness
Dimensions 3-way interaction effect, F(1, 216) = 4.64, p = 0.03,
!2 = 0.02.
On the other hand, perception of exclusion perpetrators
showed a different picture. Participants saw the perpetrator as
even more human than the control on traits about HN, and
this was mostly due to higher ratings on negative HN traits—no
significant difference in positive HN traits were observed. For HU
traits, ratings of the perpetrator were lower for positive traits but
higher for negative traits; in other words, the pattern indicates
that participants merely made a more negative evaluation of the
perpetrator compared to the control, rather than humanizing (or
dehumanizing) her in terms of HU.
Vulnerability to Exploitation and Mediations
Vulnerability to Exploitation
There was a main effect of Player, F(1, 216) = 4.87, p = 0.03,
!2 = 0.02, but not of Condition, F(1, 216) = 0.71, ns.
Player  Condition interaction for Vulnerability to Exploitation
was significant, F(1, 216)= 4.12, p= 0.04, !2 = 0.02, with simple
effects demonstrating that the victim’s perceived likelihood of
being taken advantage of was higher than that of the control, F(1,
216) = 8.97, p = 0.003, !2 = 0.04, but for the perpetrator no
difference was observed, F(1, 216) = 0.02, ns. In other words,
participants were more likely to expect that the victim would be at
the mercy of others (Table 1), which is consistent with a popular
image of an ostracism victim as a target of various kinds of social
manipulations.
To test whether effects of social exclusion manipulation
on perceived humanness of the victim and the perpetrator
explain expectations of their Vulnerability to Exploitation, we
ran parallel mediation analyses separately for the victim and
for the perpetrator with Condition (Inclusion coded as  1 and
Exclusion as 1) as the IV, two dimensions of humanness as the
mediators, and Vulnerability to Exploitation as the DV using
bootstrapping procedure with SPSS PROCESS macro by Hayes
(2013) with 1,000 resamplings. For the victim, HN significantly
mediated the relation between Condition and Vulnerability to
Exploitation, B = 0.10 with 95% confidence interval (CI) of
(0.00, 0.23); HU, on the other hand, did not mediate the
relation significantly, B =  0.02, 95% CI ( 0.07, 0.01). The
mediating effect of HN on Condition-Vulnerability relation for
the perpetrator was also significant, B =  0.05, 95% CI ( 0.10,
 0.01), but HU again did not exhibit such a mediating effect,
B =  0.00, 95% CI ( 0.04, 0.01). For both kinds of players, HN
negatively predicted Vulnerability to Exploitation. This, coupled
with higher assignment of HN for the exclusion victim (vs.
the control and the perpetrator), seems to partly explain why
observing a person being ostracized led to higher expectations of
that person getting exploited by others—and the opposite for the
perpetrator.
Other Measures of Person Perception
Participants’ ratings of the targets on other measures were
compared with two-way mixed ANOVAs, with Player as the
within-subject factor and Condition as the between-subjects
factor.
Agency and Experience
Both main effects of Player and of Condition on Agency were
significant: F(1, 216) = 73.37, p < 0.001, !2 = 0.25 for Player
and F(1, 216) = 12.67, p < 0.001, !2 = 0.06 for Condition.
A significant Player  Condition interaction effect on Agency
was also observed, F(1, 216) = 30.23, p < 0.001, !2 = 0.12,
with simple effects of Condition and of Player showing that the
victim’s perceived agency was higher than that of the control,
F(1, 216) = 4.22, p = 0.04, !2 = 0.02, but the perpetrator
was perceived as less agentic compared to the control, F(1,
216) = 37.32, p < 0.001, !2 = 0.15, as well as to the victim, F(1,
216)= 98.89, p< 0.001, !2 = 0.31. This was the opposite of what
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previous findings (Gray and Wegner, 2009) indicate: It turned
out to be the victim, not the perpetrator, that was seen as more
agentic. Regarding Experience, only the main effect of Player was
significant, F(1, 216) = 11.13, p = 0.001, !2 = 0.05, which was
driven by a higher expectation of Experience for the perpetrator
than for the victim in the exclusion condition, F(1, 216) = 10.22,
p = 0.002, !2 = 0.05. Taken together, the results involving
Agency and Experience present a puzzling pattern: In contrast
to what HN and HU patterns revealed, the victim was perceived
to be more agentic and to have less capacity for experience than
the perpetrator. Although Agency and Experience items were
not as clearly valenced as HN and HU items, it was possible
participants thought of Agency items as reflecting positive aspects
(i.e., the three items were all about high-level mental faculties)
and Experience items as probing negative aspects (the experiences
were all negative ones, such as hunger). Thus, itmay have been that
participants engaged in victim enhancement and/or perpetrator
derogation using these dimensions.
Intention/Responsibility
There was a significant Player main effect, F(1, 216) = 67.54,
p < 0.001, !2 = 0.24, as well as a significant Player  Condition
interaction effect, F(1, 216) = 35.30, p < 0.001, !2 = 0.14 on
the composite score of Intention/Responsibility. Examination of
simple effects indicated that the victim was viewed to have less
intention and responsibility for the harmful incident compared
to the control, F(1, 216) = 13.14, p < 0.001, !2 = 0.06,
while the perpetrator was perceived as having more intention
and responsibility compared to the control, F(1, 216) = 25.16,
p < 0.001, !2 = 0.10. The findings suggest that the victim was
attributed less capabilities of engaging in voluntary behavior (Gray
andWegner, 2009). At the same time, it was also possible that the
victimwas rather enhanced by less blame, whereas the perpetrator
was derogated and attributed more blame; because the behavior
was plainly negative in nature (harming another person as its
consequence), it is unclear whether the effects were driven by
victim derogation (in terms of less attribution of intent and
responsibility in general), victim enhancement (in terms of less
attribution of intent and responsibility for a negative behavior
only), or both.
Competence, Warmth and Morality
For all three measures of Competence, Warmth, and Morality,
all main and interaction effects involving Player and Condition
were significant, all Fs > 10.62, all ps < 0.01, !2 values ranging
0.05 0.26. Examination of simple effects indicated that the
perpetrator was seen as less competent, less warm, and less moral
compared to the control as well to the victim, all Fs > 22.26,
all ps < 0.001, all !2 values >0.10, while the victim and the
control did not differ on any of these dimensions, all Fs < 2.21,
ns. This indicates that these measures were used for perpetrator
derogation.
Big 5 Traits
For Extraversion, Agreeableness, and Conscientiousness, all main
and interaction effects involving Player and Condition were
significant, with all Fs > 9.29, ps < 0.003, and !2 ranging from
0.04 to 0.35. For Neuroticism, only a main effect of Player was
observed, F(1, 216) = 4.61, p = 0.03, !2 = 0.02. Lastly, there
was only a significant Player by Condition interaction effect on
Openness to Experience, F(1, 216) = 15.34, p < 0.001, !2 = 0.07.
Simple effects analyses revealed that the victim was evaluated
as less extraverted and more agreeable compared to the control,
Fs > 13.69, ps < 0.001, !2 at least 0.06, and also less extraverted,
more agreeable,more conscientious, andmore neurotic compared
to the perpetrator, Fs> 6.06, ps<= 0.02, !2>= 0.03. In contrast,
the perpetrator was seen as less agreeable, less conscientious, and
less open to experience compared to the control, all Fs>= 10.45,
p<= 0.001, !2 >= 0.05. These data draw a picture of the victim
as a socially inhibited but nice and principled individual, while
the impression of the perpetrator appears to be that of a socially
more skilled, but less friendly, more careless, and closed-minded
person.
DISCUSSION
This study tested whether evaluations of individuals on aspects of
human characteristics would vary as a function of involvement in
a social exclusion (as a victim, as a perpetrator, or uninvolved).
The findings supported our hypothesis that third party observers
would view a victim of ostracism as less human on both
dimensions of HN and of HU. In stark contrast, the perpetrator
was assigned even more humanness on 3 out of 4 aspects (i.e.,
positive and negativeHN traits, and negativeHU traits) compared
to the control. The victim was also more (and the perpetrator,
less) expected to be taken advantage of by others. A mediation
analysis showed that these differences in expected likelihood of
being exploited can be explained by perception of less HN—but
not HU—characteristics.
Overall, dehumanization as well as its mediating effect was
more strongly observed on HN than on HU; this is in line
with previous research (Haslam et al., 2005; Haslam and Bain,
2007; Bastian and Haslam, 2010). HN is the characteristics that
humans are essentially born with and share with other people
(Haslam et al., 2005), and being ostracized implies that one is
expelled from the group she belonged to, i.e., the human race.
Accordingly, HN should be the core dimension of humanness
in the context of social disconnection and dehumanization, on
which observers evaluate victims and perpetrators of ostracism to
different degrees.
Negating the victim’s humanness has important implications
for perception of their moral values. Those denied HN may be
seen as undeserving of moral caring (Bastian et al., 2011) and
would be treated out of moral boundary, which can result in
observers’ indifference to the victim’s suffering or even active
wrongdoing toward them. The victim and the harm inflicted
on them threatens the observers’ need to maintain the belief
about a just world (Lerner and Miller, 1978) or the need for
feelings of protection (Shaver, 1970), and rationalizing an unjust
situation by blaming the victim can be one of the strategies to
restore the threatened motives (Lerner and Miller, 1978; Burger,
1981). Accordingly, to alleviate discomfort, observers may deploy
victim blaming and derogation, by way of subtle denial of human
qualities.
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For most of the other human features examined, the overall
results indicated that the victim was judged in an enhancing
way whereas the perpetrator was perceived in a derogating way.
Compared to the perpetrator, the victim was assessed as more
agentic, more competent, warmer, more moral, more agreeable,
and more conscientious. Although these results seem to go
against findings on HN and HU, it is not entirely inconceivable
that different aspects of impressions of an exclusion victim
(and of a perpetrator) are at odds with one another. Kay
et al. (2005) demonstrated that when people’s belief that the
world is a just place is threatened by witnessing adversities of
a victim, they would use both victim derogation and victim
enhancement as functionally compatible means to maintain the
belief. Additionally in Callan and Ellard’s (2003) study, people
explicitly evaluated a victim in a positive way but implicitly
devaluated the same person. In line with these studies, our
finding confirmed that two opposite evaluations of a person
(i.e., dehumanization and enhancement of the same victim) are
possible, which suggests that behind favorable attitudes toward a
victim, people can dehumanize her at the same time.
As mentioned in Materials and Methods, the negative HN
and HU scores were correlated with each other. Accordingly,
interpretations involving those scores should be made with
caution. Given that the two dimensions reflect distinct aspects of
mind perception (and therefore should be independent for each
other), it is possible that participants only focused on the valence
of the negative trait terms rather than differentiating the two. So
instead of dehumanizing the victim relative to the perpetrator, it
may have been that participants simply derogated the perpetrator.
Although this is highly possible, it does not critically compromise
our general claim because, after all, the main finding of interest
involves the higher positiveHN rating for the perpetrator. Because
the positive HN and HU scores were only weakly correlated with
each other, it is safer to assume that they indeed tap HN and HU.
Future research can investigate issues unexplored or unresolved
in the current study. First, the results involving Agency and
Experience are in conflict with previous research, which for
example demonstrated that, by ascribingmore Experience, people
viewed the victim of date rape as amoral patient who is susceptible
to harm and pain (Gray and Wegner, 2009). These inconsistent
results about victims and perpetrators may be due to differences
in the nature of what targets in different studies go through.
Future research would need to test whether, depending on the
kinds and intensities of harm inflicted on victims, judgments of
victims’ humanness characteristics would show different patterns.
Second, in our research, observers devalue the humanness of a
person after watching strangers seemingly ostracize that person
for a short period. Observers’ judgments of a target person may
vary according to group membership of the person. People tend
to consider more favorably, and act more generously to, ingroup
than outgroup members (Dovidio and Gaertner, 2010). Future
work could examine if observers’ evaluation of human values
of a victim would differ depending on whether a victim is an
ingroup or an outgroup member. Third, we argued that denying
one’s humanness is a subtle way of derogating people that could
be an underlying mechanism of justification of ostracism. Future
research can more directly test the relationship between victim
dehumanization and ostracism justification, by way of examining
whether being a victim of social exclusion would render one
less deserving of moral care. In addition, validity of the current
findings could be bolstered using alternate methods to assess
humanness attribution (such as implicit measurement; Loughnan
and Haslam, 2007). One limitation of the current study involves
measurement of humanness dimensions, namely that we had
to remove some items because of internal consistency issues;
replication using alternative methods would help addressing
interpretation ambiguities borne out by such measurement
problems.
In conclusion, our research presents evidence that from the
perspective of third party observers, a victim of social exclusion
can be seen as less human. In order to prevent or minimize
damages to a victim, it is important to understand how observers
perceive the victim, which can strongly influence observers’
attitude toward her (Sainio et al., 2011; Salmivalli et al., 2011).
Yet to date there has been little work on perceived humanness of
ostracism victims from a third party perspective. Our finding that
people would deny a victim full humanity is alarming because,
within everyday social interactions, this kind of devaluation on
others can be commonly occurring. It implies that to others’ eyes,
whether you are “in” or “out” partly decides whether or not you
are fully human.
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